Toyota tends to dismiss customer complaints and the lack of a clear procedure for the treatment of security issues were among the problems identified Monday by a panel of inquiry of the manufacturer recalled more than 14 million vehicles because problems which included carpet and floor acceleration.
The panel of seven members, created last year by Toyota and headed by a former United States Secretary Transportation, Rodney E. Slater has not sought to determine whether the defects could have caused electronic vehicle suddenly accelerated. A federal investigation found no evidence of an electronic problem, the statement mirroring Toyota's problems were limited to faulty accelerator pedals and floor mats ill-fitting.
But the report said Monday Toyota had soon discovered the pedal and the issues of carpet because he saw the complaints filed by the Company or to regulatory agencies of the federal government on a sudden acceleration skepticism and defensiveness. He said that Toyota had failed to apply the principles of its manufacturing process, known as the "Toyota Way" and built around the concept of detecting and responding quickly to problems, evaluate the criticism from external sources .
The report describes the attitude of Toyota to the regulators, who fined the company nearly 50 million take too long to initiate recalls, as "contradictory."
"The very culture that works so well for them when things are stable and predictable really does not work when you're faced with a crisis quickly," Jeremy Anwyl, chief executive of the vehicle information site Edmunds.com Web , said. "If you had to characterize a society which was a kind of very vulnerable to this is Toyota."
The recalls have dealt a devastating blow to Toyota. The company is struggling to overcome the damage to its reputation once impeccable, and the effect was evident in its sales.
Toyota was the only major manufacturer to report a drop in sales last year, while the rest of the industry has experienced a 13 per cent. He continued to lag behind its competitors in 2011, even as small fuel efficient cars - his strength - become more popular.
The report indicates that Toyota had security treaty differently from other manufacturers, lumps in the larger question of "quality" and making it part of everyone's responsibility rather than assign specific settings and employees.
"The safety and quality attributes are very different, and a process that produces quality vehicles will not necessarily produce safe vehicles," said a member of the group, Brian O'Neill, former president of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. "This philosophy of safety could suffer the old adage:" When everyone is responsible, nobody is responsible. "
Committee members met with leaders of many Toyota, spoke with President Akio Toyoda, shortly after the earthquake in Japan in March by telephone and visited a large number of plants of the company and the offices of This study has led to recalls. The panel is composed of persons outside the company who are paid by the automaker, but members have refused to disclose their compensation, citing confidentiality agreements.
While some said they had been long and Toyota Lexus drivers, all insisted they had acted independently, and they conceded that Toyota is unlikely to follow all their recommendations.
The report indicates that Toyota had taken important steps toward improvement, including the appointment of a chief security officer worldwide, but he made numerous additional recommendations. He says, for example, that Toyota should have one manager to oversee operations in North America, which now operate as separate sales organizations, engineering and manufacturing, each declaration of executives in Japan.
Some group members suggested that the severity and frequency of sudden acceleration incidents had been exaggerated.
"Any machine built by a company as long as they employ humans, will be imperfect," said one member, Norman R. Augustine, a former officer of Lockheed Martin. "The record for Toyota is that security issues are so rare that, statistically, one must be very comfortable driving a Toyota or Lexus." Mr. Augustine added that he drove a Lexus.
Among the key recommendations by the group is for Toyota to decentralize its corporate structure and break down silos within the organization which "hinders the exchange of information and contributed to a miscommunication." The report concluded, "Toyota has erred too much on the side of the centralization of global needs and tip the balance more towards greater local authority and control."
Toyota said it had already given more decision making power to executives outside its headquarters, particularly in North America, where he created the position of chief quality manager more than a year ago. The company also added more time to test in the development of new vehicles.
"Over the past year, Toyota has learned a lot by listening to the valuable advice of the commission," Mr. Toyoda said in a statement. "Their advice has been taken into account the concrete measures we have taken to give our North American operations more autonomy and become an even more safety-oriented and responsive. "
When Toyota created the review board last year, company officials said it was meant to be for two years. In its second year, the committee is to monitor how Toyota makes its recommendations and their effectiveness.
Even if the committee is funded by Toyota, analysts said they saw a genuine interest in the company in repairing problems revealed by the survey. Reminders, compounded recently by the earthquake in Japan which has disrupted production for months, Toyota has left on the defensive and eager to regain some of the momentum it has lost.
The panel of seven members, created last year by Toyota and headed by a former United States Secretary Transportation, Rodney E. Slater has not sought to determine whether the defects could have caused electronic vehicle suddenly accelerated. A federal investigation found no evidence of an electronic problem, the statement mirroring Toyota's problems were limited to faulty accelerator pedals and floor mats ill-fitting.
But the report said Monday Toyota had soon discovered the pedal and the issues of carpet because he saw the complaints filed by the Company or to regulatory agencies of the federal government on a sudden acceleration skepticism and defensiveness. He said that Toyota had failed to apply the principles of its manufacturing process, known as the "Toyota Way" and built around the concept of detecting and responding quickly to problems, evaluate the criticism from external sources .
The report describes the attitude of Toyota to the regulators, who fined the company nearly 50 million take too long to initiate recalls, as "contradictory."
"The very culture that works so well for them when things are stable and predictable really does not work when you're faced with a crisis quickly," Jeremy Anwyl, chief executive of the vehicle information site Edmunds.com Web , said. "If you had to characterize a society which was a kind of very vulnerable to this is Toyota."
The recalls have dealt a devastating blow to Toyota. The company is struggling to overcome the damage to its reputation once impeccable, and the effect was evident in its sales.
Toyota was the only major manufacturer to report a drop in sales last year, while the rest of the industry has experienced a 13 per cent. He continued to lag behind its competitors in 2011, even as small fuel efficient cars - his strength - become more popular.
The report indicates that Toyota had security treaty differently from other manufacturers, lumps in the larger question of "quality" and making it part of everyone's responsibility rather than assign specific settings and employees.
"The safety and quality attributes are very different, and a process that produces quality vehicles will not necessarily produce safe vehicles," said a member of the group, Brian O'Neill, former president of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. "This philosophy of safety could suffer the old adage:" When everyone is responsible, nobody is responsible. "
Committee members met with leaders of many Toyota, spoke with President Akio Toyoda, shortly after the earthquake in Japan in March by telephone and visited a large number of plants of the company and the offices of This study has led to recalls. The panel is composed of persons outside the company who are paid by the automaker, but members have refused to disclose their compensation, citing confidentiality agreements.
While some said they had been long and Toyota Lexus drivers, all insisted they had acted independently, and they conceded that Toyota is unlikely to follow all their recommendations.
The report indicates that Toyota had taken important steps toward improvement, including the appointment of a chief security officer worldwide, but he made numerous additional recommendations. He says, for example, that Toyota should have one manager to oversee operations in North America, which now operate as separate sales organizations, engineering and manufacturing, each declaration of executives in Japan.
Some group members suggested that the severity and frequency of sudden acceleration incidents had been exaggerated.
"Any machine built by a company as long as they employ humans, will be imperfect," said one member, Norman R. Augustine, a former officer of Lockheed Martin. "The record for Toyota is that security issues are so rare that, statistically, one must be very comfortable driving a Toyota or Lexus." Mr. Augustine added that he drove a Lexus.
Among the key recommendations by the group is for Toyota to decentralize its corporate structure and break down silos within the organization which "hinders the exchange of information and contributed to a miscommunication." The report concluded, "Toyota has erred too much on the side of the centralization of global needs and tip the balance more towards greater local authority and control."
Toyota said it had already given more decision making power to executives outside its headquarters, particularly in North America, where he created the position of chief quality manager more than a year ago. The company also added more time to test in the development of new vehicles.
"Over the past year, Toyota has learned a lot by listening to the valuable advice of the commission," Mr. Toyoda said in a statement. "Their advice has been taken into account the concrete measures we have taken to give our North American operations more autonomy and become an even more safety-oriented and responsive. "
When Toyota created the review board last year, company officials said it was meant to be for two years. In its second year, the committee is to monitor how Toyota makes its recommendations and their effectiveness.
Even if the committee is funded by Toyota, analysts said they saw a genuine interest in the company in repairing problems revealed by the survey. Reminders, compounded recently by the earthquake in Japan which has disrupted production for months, Toyota has left on the defensive and eager to regain some of the momentum it has lost.
